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Abstract: Patent pools do not correct all problems associated with patent thickets. In this respect, patent pools might not 
stop the outsider problem from striking pools. Moreover, patent pools can be expensive to negotiate, can exclude patent 
holders with smaller numbers of patents or enable a group of major players to form a cartel that excludes new competitors. 
For all the above reasons, patent pools are subject to regulatory clearance because they could result in a monopoly. The 
aim of this article is to present the relationship between patents and competition in a broad context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 As the quantity of patents has increased, patent thickets 
(i.e. multiple upstream patents, where overlapping rights 
may impede the commercialisation of a product or process) 
have emerged, blocking innovation by others. In order to 
accommodate this, patent pools have been established [1, 2]. 
 A patent pool is an agreement between two or more 
patent owners to licence one or more of their patents to one 
another, or to licence them as a package to third parties [3]. 
Patent pools create useable bundles that overcome the 
‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ while preserving the 
incentives to innovate. These co-operative arrangements 
allow the holders of several patents, all of which are 
necessary for the development of a product or process, to 
licence or assign their rights at a single price. Patent pools 
already have a history of helping technological and product 
development when rights are splintered. Further, patent 
pools also reduce licence transaction costs, distribute risks 
among the members of the pool and foster better exchange of 
information [4]. 
 However, patent pools do not correct all problems 
associated with patent thickets. And there’s nothing to stop 
the ‘outsider problem’ from striking pools, if members of a 
pool see a more lucrative route, they can simply step out and 
block the collective endeavour [5]. Moreover, patent pools 
can be expensive to negotiate, can exclude patent holders 
with smaller numbers of patents or enable a group of major 
players to form a cartel that excludes new competitors [6]. 
 In particular, Lerner and Tirole [7] have built a tractable 
model which provides the following insights. First, a pool is 
more likely to be welfare-enhancing if patents are more 
complementary. That the demand margin binds in the 
absence of pool is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition 
for a pool to be welfare-enhancing. Second, a pool is never 
affected by the possibility of independent licencing if and 
only if the pool is welfare-enhancing. Furthermore, with only  
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two patents, independent licencing always yields the same 
outcome as in the absence of a pool if the pool is welfare-
decreasing in the absence of independent licences. With 
more than two patents and a welfare-decreasing pool, there 
exists an independent-licencing equilibrium with the same 
outcome as in the absence of a pool. Third, the results 
generalise to a setting where the patents vary in importance. 
Furthermore, when one patent is dominant (so that the other 
patents cannot be used without it), a patent pool 
unambiguously boosts welfare. Fourth, when pool members 
are also downstream users, two additional concerns may 
emerge: pool members may be reluctant to create 
competitors by licencing to third parties, and licensors may 
seek to raise each others’ cost by charging royalties. 
Regarding the first possibility, the results can be generalised 
as long as licencing contracts takes the form of fixed fees 
and the licenced technology reduces downstream users’ fixed 
costs. In a setting where there are no third-party licencees, if 
royalties are not allowed, welfare may be harmed as 
otherwise-desirable pools are discouraged from being 
formed. Fifth, allowing a pool encourages innovation. 
Determining the impact on ex ante social welfare, however, 
is likely to be much more difficult. But allowing a pool with 
independent licencing never reduces and may increase ex 
ante welfare. 
 In this context, there is a need for the proper balance 
between the patent-related contracts and their impact on 
competition. The several uses of patents have been watched 
by competition authorities. Patent licences can be used for 
sharing markets by the inclusion of territorial exclusivity, or 
fixing prices even indirectly. Cross-licences can be regarded 
as tools for collusion and as barriers to entry. Patent pools 
are subject to regulatory clearance because they could result 
in a monopoly. The multiplicity of patents over a single area, 
with royalty-stacking, can cost so much that it might hamper 
innovation. The large number of patent holders might result 
in the tragedy of anti-commons, chronic under-use of 
patented resources. 
 The aim of this article is to present the relationship 
between patents and competition to keep a sense of 
perspective about what has been done scholarly. The 
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remainder of this study is organised as follows. To begin 
with, the methodology is described. Next, the problématique 
is addressed. In turn, what is known, what is new and what 
remains to be learned are presented. 
METHODOLOGY 
 A review of previous academic and policy-making 
documents have been conducted. For academic publications, 
Thomson Scientific’s Web of Science, Elsevier’s Scopus and 
Google Scholar have been used as search engines in order to 
retrieve state-of-the-art literature. For policy-making 
documents, Eur-lex has been employed, which provides 
online access to the EU official journal, treaties, legislation 
in force, preparatory acts, case law, and documents of the 
European Parliament, Council and Commission. 
 Further, the literature review addressed the research 
questions listed below. In addition, relevant references have 
been searched and then sorted them out into a coherent view 
of the state of the art as it now stands. In particular, a 
structure dealing with the research questions has been 
followed while carrying out the literature review: 
1. Problématique: What is the issue at stake here? Why 
is it relevant? Why are we discussing this in the first 
place? 
2. What is already known: What is the knowledge we 
are building upon? What has already been 
established? What is the current ‘state of the art’ in 
the topic? 
3. What is new: What are the recent developments? 
What is currently being debated? What have we 
learned from the references? Which are the points of 
contention and their implications? 
4. What remains to be learned: What are the future 
avenues of research or debate? What are the ‘blind 
spots’ that still need to be tackled? Where is the topic 
or issue headed? Is there a need either for policy 
options or fields that require policy actions? Are the 
major issues studied in the project falling out of the 
mainstream legislative process? 
 Particularly, the following tasks have been carried out to 
achieve the overall aim: 
• Retrieved references. 
• Reviewed selected publications. 
• Digested and distilled content. 
• Drafted the review and provided policy recommendations. 
• Validated findings and suggestions by relevant 
stakeholders. 
Problématique 
 Innovators are motivated by high-expected profits, which 
are higher with a monopolistic position. On the other hand, 
companies in a situation of solid monopolistic position tend 
not to be motivated to innovate, as that would not  
 
significantly increase their already substantial profit margin. 
The threat or reality of competition forces incumbents to 
innovate, while for newcomers innovation is their ticket to 
enter the market [8]. 
 A patent is the right to exclude competitors. A patent has 
direct anti-competitive effects as a product will have a higher 
price if it embodies a patented technology due to market 
power conferred by the patent. Nonetheless, competition will 
be induced by follow-up inventions in a dynamic process. In 
fast-moving technological areas, the monopoly position 
possibly provided by successful innovation is only 
temporary as new inventions arrive quickly, with superior 
technology taking over the market and leapfrogging 
incumbents. In this cycle, patents play the role of 
strengthening the market power that accrues to the successful 
inventor, hence reinforcing the incentive to innovate ex ante, 
but possibly weakening the incentive to innovate for the 
winner, at least ex post [9]. 
 According to Duxbury and Tuck, a more recent factor 
affecting pharmaceutical companies’ patenting and 
protection strategies is the European Commission’s stance 
on antitrust law in an intellectual property context. The 
AstraZeneca decision (Commission Decision of 2005: Case 
COMP/37.507: Generics/AstraZeneca) together with the 
Commission’s continuing sector inquiry have left the 
industry facing a great deal of uncertainty over what it will 
be permissible for a company to carry out in its intellectual 
property and commercial strategy, particularly when in a 
dominant position. The Commission’s definition of the 
market in the AstraZeneca case seems to unfairly penalise 
the innovative company by creating a structure where the 
innovator that is the first to market a new class of drugs will 
inevitably be in a dominant position [10]. 
 The preliminary results of the sector inquiry [11] show 
that market entry of generic companies and the development 
of new and more affordable medicines is sometimes blocked 
or delayed, at significant cost to healthcare systems, 
consumers and taxpayers. Citing a sample of medicines that 
faced patent expiration in the period 2000 to 2007 in 17 
Member States, the European Commission report suggested 
that additional savings of around 3 billion would have been 
possible on that sample over this period if generic medicines 
had entered the market without delay. For the same samples 
over the said period total savings gained by generic entry 
amounted to at least 14 billion, the report added. Defining 
originator companies as the ones that develop and sell new 
medicines, the report found that these companies used a 
variety of methods to delay or block the market entry of not 
only generic companies but also other originator 
competitors. On the practices that the originator drug 
companies use to delay or block market entry of competing 
medicines, the European Commission listed among others: 
multiple patent applications for the same medicine (so called 
patent clusters,) initiation of disputes and litigation, 
conclusion of patent settlements which constrain market 
entry of generic companies and interventions before national 
authorities when generic companies ask for regulatory 
approvals [12]. 
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What is Already Known? 
 As far as the legal architecture is concerned, the antitrust 
area covers two prohibition rules set out in the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (EC Treaty). First, 
agreements between two or more firms which restrict 
competition are prohibited by Article 81 of the EC Treaty, 
subject to some limited exceptions. Second, firms in a 
dominant position may not abuse that position (Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty). The European Commission is empowered by 
the EC Treaty to apply these prohibition rules and enjoys a 
number of investigative powers to that end (e.g. inspection in 
business and non-business premises, written requests for 
information etc). It may also impose fines on undertakings 
which violate EU antitrust rules. All national competition 
authorities are also empowered to apply fully the provisions 
of the EC Treaty in order to ensure that competition is not 
distorted or restricted. National courts may also apply these 
prohibitions so as to protect the individual rights conferred to 
citizens by the EC Treaty. “Articles 81 and 82 are now 
Articles 101 and 102 in the consolidated version of the treaty 
on the functioning of the European union”. 
 From the perspective of economics, there is a direct 
relationship between the sales of innovative products and 
market structure and, implicitly, the average size of firms in 
a specific branch. According to the product life cycle, there 
are many small firms that compete in the first stages of 
technological development on design, and on combinations 
of product and market. In this situation, the market structure 
manifests a low seller concentration. Later in the cycle, when 
a specific combination of product and market dominates 
technological development, and when consumers are more 
inclined towards a particular design, firms have to abandon 
their unsuccessful product-market combinations in favour of 
a more successful competing design. Once a dominant 
design has been established, firms will start to compete on 
price and economies of scale become an important 
determinant in order to survive, which can lead to the start of 
an oligopolistic shake-out. 
 Many firms that fail to achieve a minimum efficient 
production scale must sooner or later leave the market, 
which results in a market dominated by a few large firms 
competing on price [13]. Nevertheless, firms facing Bertrand 
competition possess a strong incentive to increase their profit 
margin through product differentiation, and will therefore 
reap more sales from new products if their products succeed 
in time [14]. Small firms, in turn, possess a strong incentive 
to introduce new products into the market in order to survive 
competition with current firms. Large firms have an 
incentive to invest in both process (economies of scale) and 
product innovation (economies of scope) in order to maintain 
their market position [15]. Finally, Aghion et al. [16] show 
that an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition 
and innovation is a good fit, which challenges both empirical 
and theoretical findings in the traditional literature. 
 A patent rewards an invention, a new technology, which 
sometimes results in creating a new market. In that case, the 
effect of patents from the time period without the protected 
invention to the time period with the protected invention is 
not to restrict competition on markets already existing in the 
previous period of time, but to create a new market (possibly 
monopolised, but still better than no market at all). Second, 
patents offer a substitute to secrecy and involve disclosure, 
hence they encourage further innovation (i.e. competition of 
new products against existing ones). Third, patents can serve 
the creation of new companies by protecting them from 
competitive strategies based on incumbency, such as size, 
brand or sunk costs. 
 Firms tend to patent more of their inventions when they 
are confronted with more intense competition. Weaker 
competition, due to regulation or high-entry cost, provides 
protection other than intellectual property rights (IPRs) to the 
innovations of the incumbents, which then have little reason 
to incur the cost of filing IPRs and disclosing their 
technology. However, as patents in turn reduce ex post the 
degree of competition on a market, it is difficult to observe 
correlation between patenting and competition at the market 
equilibrium. 
What is New? 
 In knowledge-intensive industries, competition is based 
less on prices and current market share and more on new 
products and technologies and future market share. The 
market power criterion is more fragile as the state of play can 
be reshuffled by new technologies. Substitute products are 
not the current competitors but the ones that will be on the 
market in the future [17]. 
 In particular, Reitzig [18] shows that multiple patents per 
invention are filed in both discrete and complex 
technologies. In selected discrete technologies, patent fences 
may serve to exclude competitors whereas in complex 
technologies, patent thickets represent exchange forums for 
complementary technology. The results expand on 
traditional views of profitable patent exploitation across 
industries, which suggest that different legislative issues 
arise from multiple patenting per innovation in complex and 
discrete technologies depending on the degree of 
technological complementarity. The results have unexpected 
policy implications in that they illustrate how patentees 
could eliminate competition in the form of substitute 
technologies through fencing. 
 In one case of the European Commission pharmaceutical 
sector inquiry, 1300 EU-wide patents (patent clusters) were 
filed for a single medicine. The inquiry pointed out that 
nearly 700 cases of reported patent litigation with generic 
companies were filed. Although the generic companies won 
some of these cases, there were many settlement agreements 
for ending an ongoing litigation or dispute. These specific 
settlements limited the entry to the market of the generic 
medicines and provided for payments from the originator to 
the generic companies. Moreover, the report found 
strangulation of innovation, as some originator companies 
used defensive patenting strategies thus obstructing the path 
of innovation from competing pharmaceutical companies, 
imposing a final delay to consumers’ access to innovative 
medicines. 
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 Further, Roox et al. [19] depict the key areas in which the 
patent system and the legal and regulatory framework fail to 
ensure an appropriate balance between incentives and 
competition, such as failings in the system for granting 
quality patents, patent thickets and follow-up patents, patent 
litigation procedures and other patent-related barriers. First 
of all, failings in the system for granting quality patents 
comprise a lack of rigorous assessment of the patentability 
requirements, in particular of the inventive step, lack of 
quality of applications, examiners’ inability to check data 
presented to them, not enough consideration of third-party 
observation by examiners and weaknesses in the opposition 
procedure. Second, patent thickets and follow-up patents 
encompass unjustifiable extension of the monopoly by 
follow-up patents, multiple divisional patent applications 
that are entirely identical to the parent specifying data 
without linking it to the claims, second and subsequent use 
claims, and genuine incremental innovation compared to 
simple changes. Third, patent litigation procedures include 
the complexity and unpredictability of litigation across the 
EU and improper granting of interim injunctions, Finally, 
other patent-related barriers cover patent linkage, statements 
to authorities, shifting consumer demand with marketing 
campaigns, supplementary protection certificates granted on 
the basis of incorrect information. 
What Remains to be Learned? 
 Patents can be used in anti-competitive strategies, whose 
aim is to exclude other companies (competitors) from the 
market. In that context, patents are not just means to exclude 
competitors, they are instruments used by incumbent firms to 
raise entry barriers. Patents are also used by new entrants to 
penetrate markets. Patents are used in standard-setting 
processes and for making alliances. This diversified role of 
patents renders their effect on competition more complex. 
Some anti-competitive strategies are clearly illegal, others 
are abuses of the system, permitting an undue extension of 
the exclusive right beyond the one granted by the patent 
office. These practices can be deterred, and often are, by a 
close monitoring by competition authorities. A question 
raised to patent offices is to what extent could such practices 
be hampered upstream, by granting patents which would not 
facilitate, or would even hamper them? Could patent law and 
practice tackle some of these problems? 
 Pharmaceutical companies enjoy patent protection for 
their products. Once the patent has expired, producers of 
similar generic products can enter the market. 
Pharmaceutical companies that try to prolong patent 
protection for a product may breach EU competition rules. 
Such behaviour can also have the side effect of removing 
incentives to innovate as competition from generic products 
encourages the creation of new products. In this respect, 
AstraZeneca was deemed to abused the patent system and 
the system for authorisation of medicines with the aim of 
delaying competition to a blockbuster drug from generic and 
parallel imported pharmaceuticals. AstraZeneca was fined 
60 million. The appeal is currently pending before the 
Court of First Instance. As a result of this first case, the 
Commission intensified the monitoring of competition in the 
sector of generic medicines. The first findings indicate that 
competition in the market for human medicines may not be 
working well in Europe; fewer new medicines are being 
brought to market and the entry of generic medicines 
sometimes seems to be delayed. The Commission has 
therefore opened a sector inquiry to investigate the reasons 
for this [20]. 
 The financial institutions have devised various tools for 
patent holders to obtain monetary value from their patents 
more promptly than collecting royalties from licences. These 
mechanisms include securitisation based on anticipated 
royalty income streams, auction of patents, patent 
collateralisation, patent sale-lease-back arrangement, and 
patent litigation insurance. The European Commission 
opened formal proceedings in January 2009 after complaints 
were lodged in July 2008 because of non-requested services. 
Standard & Poor's is the only issuer of valid identifying 
numbers of American bonds or stocks. Without these unique 
numbers, securities cannot be exchanged, according to 
international agreements aimed at avoiding duplication and 
potential loss of assets. According to plaintiffs, Standard & 
Poor’s is thus benefiting from its monopoly by imposing 
charges not only on providers of financial data such as 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters, but also by charging 
financial institutions directly. The potential new charge 
follows a wide-ranging review of rules governing credit 
rating agencies’ activities launched by the Commission in 
November 2008. Internal Market Commissioner Charlie 
McCreevy has chosen to highlight the responsibilities of 
rating agencies on several occasions during the ongoing 
financial crisis. The agencies stand accused of setting 
excessively high credit rates, which later turned insolvent 
[21]. 
 In one of the scenarios on how might intellectual 
property regimes evolve by 2025, patent pools are brought 
into account. In the setting called ‘Blue Skies’, a globally 
positive attitude to technology has led to flourishing 
healthcare R&D. Pharmaceutical companies still rely on 
patents, albeit with restrictions that ensure research 
exemptions and access for poorer nations. Areas such as 
genetic diagnostics have adopted a system of licencing, 
patent pools and clearinghouses to ensure optimal use of 
available technologies. But major breakthroughs come from 
a thriving information and communication technology sector 
that enables new forms of disease prevention by combining 
sophisticated diagnostics, advice and the control of human 
behaviour using technology. Epidemiological, pharma-
ceutical and genetic research is helped by huge inter-
connected databases bringing genomic, clinical, familial and 
social data together on a worldwide scale. Ethical objections 
to biotechnology have made way for ‘utilitarian’ cost-benefit 
appraisal: stem-cell treatments, advanced prosthetics and 
embryo screening are accepted. The first attempts at genetic 
enhancement are supported in large parts of society. 
 Finally, complements to competition and patents are 
open source, open science, open access, open innovation and 
open standards. Open source projects are based on 
collaborative innovation and are characterised by a non-
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proprietary setting. Open science offers free collaboration 
and rapid public disclosure of results with no restrictions on 
use other than acknowledging the source. Open access 
provides users free reading, downloading, copying, 
distributing, printing, searching or linking. Open innovation 
prioritises partnering, licencing and venturing to combine 
internal and external sources of ideas and technologies. Open 
standards are publicly available specifications which give a 
common method of achieving a particular goal. 
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